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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
LAURA LEE BLOXHAM FULLMER, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
BRIAN KEITH FULLMER, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
Case No. 870499-CA 
Category No. 7 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
JURISDICTION 
The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction over this 
domestic relations matter pursuant to Utah Code Annotated Section 
78-2a-3(2)(g). 
NATURE OF PROCEEDING 
This is an appeal from a final order modifying a decree of 
divorce in the Fourth Judicial District Court, Judge Boyd L. Park 
presiding, in which the lower court modified the previously 
entered Decree of Divorce as to child custody, child support, 
alimony and federal and state tax exemptions. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ON APPEAL 
I. Did the trial court err when it found that there had 
been, since the time of the decree, changes in the circumstances 
upon which the previous custody award was based? 
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II. Was the court's finding that plaintiff-appellant's work 
schedule, which necessitated the placement of the minor child in a 
day care center, a sufficient substantial and material change of 
circumstances to justify the reopening of the issue of custody? 
III. Does the remarrige of defendant-respondent to a full-
time homemaker constitute a material change of circumstances to 
justify reopening the question of custody? 
IV. Did the trial court err in its determination of a 
material change ir circumstances which resulted in the reopening 
the issue of custody? 
V. Did the trial court err when it did not set an 
appropriate amount for plaintiff-appellant to pay to defendant-
respondent as child support? 
VI. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in failing to 
terminate the previous award of alimony? 
VII. Did the trial court err when it awarded the 1987 and 
1988 federal and state income tax exemption for the minor child to 
defendant-respondent? 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATE STATUTES 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 30-3-5(3): 
The court has continuing jurisdiction to make 
subsequent changes of new orders for the support and 
maintenance of the parties, the custody of the children 
and their support, maintenance, health, and dental care, 
or the distribution of the property as is reasonable and 
necessary. 
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STATEMENT OF THg_gASg 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE. 
This is an appeal from a final order modifying a decree of 
divorce entered after a trial on defendant-respondent's Amended 
Petition to Modify a decree of divojrce and plaintiff-appellant's 
Counter Petition to Modify a decree of divorce in the Fourth 
judicial District Court, Judge Boyd t- Park presiding, in which 
the Pecree of Divcrce signed by Judge David Sam on February 19, 
1985, was modified in regards to child custody, child support, and 
tax exemptions. 
B. COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS. 
The original decree of divorce in this matter was entered 
pursuant to a "default divorce" in which defendant-respondent, who 
was unrepresented by counsel, entered into a stipulation with 
plaintiff-appellant. Subsequently, on February 19, 1985, Judge 
David Sam of the Fourth Judicial District Court signed the decree 
of divorce, which became final three months later on May 19, 1985. 
(R. 22 through 23) The decree of divorce awarded plaintiff-
appellant custody of the minor child, but the findings of fact in 
support of said decree did not designate either party as being a 
fit and proper person to be awarded the permanent care, custody 
and control of the minor child. Child support was set at $150 per 
montH/ and alimony was set at $200 pejr month. The issue of tax 
exemptions was not addressed. 
3 
A petition to modify decree of divorce was filed in September 
of 1986 by defendant-respondent in which he requested that child 
custody be awarded to him. (R. 28) Subsequently, defendant-
respondent filed an amended petition to modify in February of 1987 
requesting termination of alimony and award to him of the federal 
and state income tax exemptions for the minor child. (R. 62) 
Plaintiff-appellant filed a counter petition to modify decree of 
divorce in October of 1986 requesting an increase in child 
support. (R. 49) Trial was held on October 13, 1987 before the 
Honorable Judge Boyd L. Park of the Fourth Judicial District 
Court. (R. 183) 
C. DISPOSITION IN THE COURT BELOW. 
After hearing the proffered evidence of counsel, and 
reviewing the child custody evaluation performed by Bert Peterson 
of Child Custody Evaluation Services, Judge Boyd L. Park found 
that there had been a material change of circumstances with regard 
to child custody which was sufficient for reopening the custody 
issue, and that he was entitled to reconsider the issue of 
custody. After reviewing the evidence and proffered testimony, 
Judge Park awarded custody of the minor child, Dagin, to 
defendant-respondent. 
Findings of fact and conclusions of law were subsequently 
entered by the court on the 10th day of November, 1987. In 
relation to material change of circumstances with regard to 
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custody, the court stated as follows: 
a) "That since the entry of the decree of divorce, the 
defendant on September 28, 1985 married Lynda Fullmer. That the 
marriage to the present Mrs. Fullmer has created a stable 
environment for the rearing of Dagin." (R. 194) 
b) "That at the time of the entry of the decree of divorce 
in this matter, the plaintiff was working on a part-time basis and 
attended school from one to four hours a day." (R. 194) 
c) "That the part-time work schedule of the plaintiff 
enabled her to spend considerable time with the minor child." 
(R. 194) 
d) "That in August, 1987, the plaintiff has become gainfully 
employed on a full-time basis working at least eight hours per 
day. That during such time as she is working on a full-time 
basis, the child has been placed in a day care center." (R. 194) 
e) "That subsequent to the entry of the decree of divorce 
for that period of time beginning in May of 1985 and continuing 
through the beginning of the summer of 1986, the defendant, at the 
request of the plaintiff, had the child visiting with him a 
significant period of time. From time to time when the mother 
needed assistance with the care of the child, she brought the 
child to the father." (R. 194, 195) 
Having found that there had been a material change of 
circumstances justifying the court's reopening of the custody 
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issue, the court awarded the parties joint custody of the minor 
child, with defendant-respondent to be given the physical care, 
custody and control of the minor child, subject to review in one 
year, October 13., 1988, at the hour of 9:00 a.m. (R. 195, 196) 
In determining what was in the best interests of the minor child, 
the court took into consideration the following factors: primary 
caretaker, time availability, stability of the environment and 
relationship to step-parent and step-sibling. (R. 198,199) After 
determining all relevant factors, the court concluded that the 
best interests of the child would be best served by living with 
his father, defendant-respondent. (R. 318) In addition, the 
court ordered defendant-respondent to pay to plaintiff-appellant 
the sum of $250 per month as child support during the three summer 
visitation months which she would have custody (R.196 through 
197), and awarded defendant-respondent the 1987 and 1988 federal 
and state income tax exemptions for the minor child (R. 321). 
D. STATEMENT OF THE FACTS. 
Plaintiff-appellant and defendant-respondent w€*re married on 
November 22, 1980 in Salt Lake City, Utah. One child was born as 
issue of this marriage, to wit: Dagin Lester Fullmer, born May 
19, 1983. Plaintiff-appellant filed her complaint in September of 
1984. On October 5, 1984, the parties entered into a stipulation 
where both parties agreed that plaintiff-appellant was a fit and 
proper person to care for the physical needs and emotional needs 
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of the child. During all negotiations pursuant to said 
Stipulation, defendant-respondent was unrepresented by counsel. 
An amended stipulation was filed on February 19, 1985, which 
contained no provision regarding custody, but does set child 
support in the amount of $150 per month. Findings of fact and 
conclusions of law were signed on the 19th day of February, 1985, 
in which plaintiff-appellant was awarded custody of the minor 
child, Dagin. The findings do not find anybody to be a fit and 
proper person to be awarded the care, custody and control, but 
they do award custody and discuss child support. The decree of 
divorce also signed the 19th day of February, 1985, does not make 
any particular findings but simply awards custody. (R. 1 through 
23) 
Prior to the implementation of the decree of divorce, 
plaintiff-appellant fulfilled the role of primary caretaker for 
the minor child. Defendant had standard visitation, but the minor 
child was cared for and dwelled with his mother. Then, after the 
implementation of the summer visitation for 1985, the pattern 
materially changed where, rather than plaintiff-appellant as the 
custodial parent, defendant-respondent had the child residing with 
him, and in fact cared for him for three-fourths of the time. (R. 
256 through 280) 
Subsequent to the finalization of the decree of divorce, 
defendant-respondent remarried and has had a child. The current 
7 
Mrs, Fullmer tended the minor child subsequent to the remarriage 
for three to ten hours a day, six to seven days a week, (R. 256) 
Defendant-respondent filed a petition to modify the decree of 
divorce in September of 1986, requesting that he be given child 
custody over the parties1 minor child. (R. 28) The filing of the 
petition to modify was precipitated because plaintiff-appellant 
had informed defendant-respondent that she had decided to move to 
New York City, New York where she was going to pursue a modeling 
career. In addition, she informed defendant-respondent that she 
would be living there with a boyfriend and another male individual 
and that she was taking the minor child of the parties to live in 
that environment. (R. 259) Defendant-respondent later filed his 
amended petition to modify in February of 1987, requesting 
modification of the decree regarding alimony and the state and 
federal tax exemptions. (R. 62) Plaintiff-appellant filed the 
counter petition to modify in October of 1986 requesting an 
increase in child support. (R. 49) 
Trial was held before the Honorable Judge Boyd L. Park of the 
Fourth Judicial District Court on October 13, 1987. (R. 183) 
After hearing the proffered testimony, Judge Park ruled that there 
had been a material change of circumstances since the decree of 
divorce, that defendant-respondent should be awarded the permanent 
care, custody and control of the minor child of the parties, that 
child support during the three summer months in which plaintiff-
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appellant had visitation should be increased to $250 per month; 
and that defendant-respondent should be entitled to the 1987 and 
1988 federal and state income tax exemptions for the minor child. 
(R. 315 through 326) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Judge Boyd L. Park of the Fourth Judicial District Court did 
not abuse his discretion when he found that there had been a 
material change of circumstances, sufficient and material for 
purposes of reopening the custody issue. The original decree of 
divorce was entered pursuant to a "no-contest type" divorce in 
which defendant-respondent was unrepresented by counsel. The 
findings of fact and conclusions of law signed in the original 
Divorce Decree do not designate either party as being a fit and 
proper person to be awarded the permanent care, custody and 
control of the miner child of the parties. Defendant-respondent's 
proffered testimony at the hearing regarding change of custody 
stated that when h€ signed the stipulation he anticipated that the 
minor child would live with his mother, and that defendant-
respondent would have visitation. That subsequent to the entry of 
the decree of divorce, defendant-respondent had the minor child 
with him three-fourths of the time and in fact became the 
custodial parent for the minor child. In addition, plaintiff-
appellant began working on a full-time basis, thus reducing her 
time availability to spend with the minor child. 
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After having found there existed a material change of 
circumstances sufficient to justify reopening the custody issue, 
the court correctly decided de novo which custody arrangement 
would be in the best interests of the child. In doing so, the 
court took into consideration function-related factors, i.e. 
primary caretaker, time availability, stability of the environment 
and relationship to step-parent and step-sibling. The court also 
relied heavily on a child custody evaluation report submitted by 
Bert Peterson, LCSW of Child Custody Evaluation Services, wherein 
he recommended that custody of the minor child be given to 
defendant-respondent. 
Once deciding that defendant-respondent would be the 
appropriate person to be awarded the permanent care, custody and 
control of the minor child, the court failed to enter an order 
requiring plaintiff-appellant to pay to defendant-respondent child 
support, based on her ability to pay, for the minor child of the 
parties. Instead, the trial court ordered defendant-respondent to 
pay to plaintiff-appellant $250 a month in child support for the 
three summer months that she would have visitation with the minor 
child. However, in light of its order requiring defendant-
respondent to pay child support for the three months in which he 
did not have the minor child residing with him, the court 
correctly awarded defendant-respondent the 1987 and 1988 income 
tax exemptions. The court's reasoning for increase in child 
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support was based on creating a greater stream of income for the 
child, and said award was justifiably within the trial court's 
discretion. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR WHEN IT FOUND THAT 
THERE HAD BEEN, SINCE THE TIME OF THE DECREE CHANGES IN 
THE CIRCUMSTANCES UPON WHICH THE PREVIOUS CUSTODY AWARD 
WAS BASED. 
Hogge v. Hogge, 649 P.2d 51 (Utah, 1982) adopted a bifurcated 
procedure for petitions to modify decrees of divorce in regards to 
child custody. Pursuant to said procedure outlined in Hogge, the 
court first must make a determination that a substantial change of 
circumstances has occurred warranting the court to reopen the 
issue of child custody. If the court finds that a substantial 
change in circumstances has taken place since the entry of the 
decree of divorce, the court may "determine denovo which custody 
arrangement will serve the welfare or best interests of the child, 
and modify, or refuse to modify, the decree accordingly." Jd. at 
54. 
It is true that the attorneys for the parties presented 
evidence to the court in accordance with the Hogge analysis by 
first making opening statements regarding a material change of 
circumstances in regards to child custody. (R. 254, 260). The 
court acknowledged the bifurcated process as articulated in Hogge 
and expressed its familiarity with all of the cases that had been 
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cited by both counsel (R. 315). As such, the court was also 
expressing its familiarity with Moody v. Moody, 715 P. 2 507 (Utah, 
1985), which held that the court may receive child custody 
evaluation reports for purposes of making its threshold decision 
regarding substantial changes in circumstances pursuant to Hogge. 
Id. at 509 (R. 298). 
Plaintiff-appellant takes issue with the fact that the court 
allowed counsel for defendant-respondent to commence presenting 
evidence on all issues in the case prior to making a ruling 
regarding substantial change of circumstances. The bifurcated 
procedure as enumerated in Hogge v. Hogge is often difficult to 
implement at the trial level in that much of the evidence 
presented with regard to step 2 of the Hogge analysis regarding 
trial denovo is also relevant to step 1 of the Hogge analysis 
regarding material change of circumstances. The practical 
problems with regard to the Hogge analysis were articulated by 
District Court Judge Daniels in his concurring opinion in Moody v. 
Moody as follows: 
The problem with the procedure is this: the evidence 
supporting changed circumstances is almost always the 
same evidence that is used to establish the best 
interests of the child. Even when there is additional 
evidence which bears solely on the best interest 
guestion, that evidence is usually so entwined with the 
changed circumstances evidence that it is almost 
impossible to sort out. The trial judge is faced with 
an objection to almost every guestion. He or she must 
then try to figure out whether the answer would relate 
to changed circumstances, best interests or both. The 
witness freguently must be recalled to give further 
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testimony in the second phase of the hearing, which 
causes inconvenience for the witness and expense for the 
parties. 
Admittedly, some trial judges do not follow this 
cumbersome procedure. Instead, we take all of the 
evidence and sort out mentally that which relates to 
changed circumstances and that which relates to best 
interests. We then make findings on both issues, taking 
into consideration the important policy of custodial 
stability, which requires a very high standard to 
establish a material change in circumstances. Id. at 
511. 
Consequently, the trial court did not err with regard to 
listening to the entire evidence in the matter prior to entering a 
ruling regarding whether or not there had been a change of 
circumstances sufficient to warrant reopening of the child custody 
issue. Indeed, the court was justified in hearing all of the 
evidence, including the child custody evaluation submitted by Bert 
Peterson, LCSW, in making this determination of whether or not 
there were changes in circumstances that justified reopening of 
the child custody issue. 
In finding that there had been a material change of 
circumstances for purposes of reopening the custody issue, the 
court made its findings of fact, which includes some of the 
following: that at the time of the entry of the decree of divorce 
in this matter, plaintiff-appellant was working on .a part-time 
basis and attending school from one to four hours per day; that 
said part-time work schedule of plaintiff-appellant enabled her to 
spend considerable time with the minor child; that in August of 
13 
1987, plaintiff-appellant began working full-time requiring the 
minor child to be placed full-time in a day care center; that 
subsequent to the decree of divorce defendant-respondent had the 
minor child visiting with him a significant period of time at the 
request of plaintiff-appellant. (R. 194,195) All of the above 
cited reasons were part of the basis for the court finding a 
material change in circumstances for purposes of reopening the 
custody issue. The court then articulated in its findings that it 
had based its decision on finding a material change of 
circumstances primarily because of two of the reasons above cited, 
to wit: 
a. The change in plaintiff's work schedule to full-time 
employment necessitating the placement of the minor 
child, Dagin, in a day care center also on a full-time 
basis. 
b. The remarriage of defendant and his creation thereby 
of a stable home environment where the child can be 
cared for by a stepmother who is a homemaker, not 
working outside the home, during those times when the 
father is working. (R. 195) 
The complaint in the original divorce action was filed by 
plaintiff-appellant and her attorney. In the complaint for 
divorce, the plaintiff-appellant did not pray for custody of the 
minor child (R. 1,2). Defendant-respondent being unrepresented by 
counsel, entered into a stipulation with plaintiff-appellant and 
her attorney shortly after the divorce was filed (R.8). An 
amended Stipulation was subsequently entered into by the parties 
on February 13, 1985 in which neither party was awarded custody— 
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the only allusion being an award to plaintiff-appellant of $150 
per month in child support. (R. 10-12) Wherefore, findings of 
fact, conclusions cf law and a decree of divorce were duly entered 
granting to plaintiff-appellant custody of the minor child without 
any designation whatsoever or finding by the trial court that she 
was a fit and proper person to be awarded the permanent care, 
custody and control of the minor child. (R. 18 through 23) The 
only reference to plaintiff-appellant being a fit person to be 
awarded the permanent care, custody and control of the child was 
the original stipulation entered into between the parties, which 
could have arguably been superseded by the Amended Stipulation. 
Since the trial court in the original divorce made no finding 
regarding whether either party was a fit person to be awarded the 
permanent care, custody and control of the minor child, defendant-
respondent's testimony regarding his intent when executing the 
stipulations becoires relevant. Defendant-respondent's proffered 
testimony at the hearing regarding change of custody stated that 
when he had signed the stipulation he anticipated that the minor 
child would live with his mother, and defendant-respondent would 
have visitation. (R. 256 through 259) In addition, at the time of 
the decree of divorce, plaintiff-appellant had more time 
availability to care for the minor child since she was employed 
part-time and could care for the child personally for a great 
portion of the day. (R. 259, 260) The proffered testimony of 
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defendant-respondent was made part of the findings of fact of the 
court wherein it stated as follows: 
4. That at the time of the entry of the decree of 
divorce in this matter, the plaintiff was working on a 
part-time basis and attending school from one to four 
hours per day. 
5. That the part-time work schedule of the plaintiff 
enabled her to spend considerable time with the minor 
child. 
6. That in August, 1987, the plaintiff has become 
gainfully employed on a full-time basis working at least 
eight hours per day, that during such time as she is 
working on a full-time basis, the child has been placed 
in a day care center. 
7. That subsequent to the entry of the decree of 
divorce and for the period of time beginning in May of 
1985 and continuing through the beginning of the summer 
of 1986, the defendant, at the request of plaintiff had 
the child visiting with him a significant period of 
time. From time to time when the mother needed 
assistance with the care of the child, she brought the 
child to the father. (R. 194 & 195) 
The findings of fact as articulated by the Fourth Judicial 
District Court show that there are sufficient justifications for 
the court's decision that there had been a material change of 
circumstances upon which the previous award of custody had been 
based. 
II. THE COURT'S FINDING THAT PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT'S 
WORK SCHEDULE NECESSITATED THE PLACEMENT OF THE MINOR 
CHILD IN A DAY CARE CENTER WAS A SUFFICIENTLY 
SUBSTANTIAL AND MATERIAL CHANGE OF CIRCUMSTANCES TO 
JUSTIFY REOPENING THE ISSUE OF CUSTODY. 
In the case of Marchant v. Marchant, 66 Utah Adv. Rpt. 45 
(September 18, 1987), this court quoted Rule 52a of the Utah Rules 
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of Civil Procedure to state that findings of fact "shall not be 
set aside unless clearly eroneous, and due regard shall be given 
to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of 
the witness," Id. at 47. However, in the case of child custody 
awards this court articulated standards for findings of fact of a 
trial court in child custody cases, and stated that sufficient 
findings: 
1. Are sufficiently detailed; 
2. Including enough facts to disclose the process 
through which the ultimate conclusion is reached; 
3. Indicate the process is logical and properly 
supported; and 
4. Are not clearly eroneous. Id. at 47. 
In setting the standard for what factors are properly 
considered by a trial court in determining an award of custody, 
the court in Marchant reiterated the factors that had been 
previously outlined in Pusey v. Pusey, 728 P.2d 117, 120 (Utah, 
1986) and stated that child custody decisions should be based on 
findings regarding "function related factors" and articulated the 
following list to be considered by a trial court: 1) "The iden-
tity of the primary caretaker" Id. 47; 2) "The identity of the 
parent with a greater flexibility to provide personal care for the 
child" Id. at 47; 3) "The identity of the parent with whom the 
child has spent most of his or her time pending custody 
determination if that period has been lengthy" Id. at 47; 4) "The 
stability of the environment provided by each parent". 
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The Fourth Judicial District Court in its Findings of Fact 
regarding material change of circumstances stated as follows: 
4. That at the time of the entry of the decree of 
divorce in this matter, the plaintiff was working on a 
part-time basis and attending school from time to time. 
5. That the part-time work schedule of the plaintiff 
enabled her to spend considerable time with the minor 
child. 
6. That the plaintiff has become gainfully employed on 
a full-time basis working at least 8 hours per day. 
That during such time as she is working on a full-time 
basis, the child has been placed in a day care center. 
7. That subsequent to the entry of the decree of 
divorce and for that period of the time beginning in May 
of 1985 and continuing through the beginning of the 
summer of 1986, the defendant, at the request of the 
plaintiff had the child visiting with him a significant 
period of time. From time to time when the mother 
needed assistance with the care of the child, she 
brought the child to the father. (R. 194, 195) 
The above stated findings are sufficiently detailed in order 
to satisfy the requirements set forth in Marchant. Indeed, the 
findings indicate that at the time of the divorce, plaintiff was 
working part-time and attending school from time to time, and thus 
she had a great deal more time to spend with the minor child than 
defendant who was working full-time at Wicatt. Subsequent to the 
decree of divorce, plaintiff-appellant began working full-time; 
and as a result, her time availability to spend with the minor 
child was substantially reduced. Indeed, because of plaintiff-
appellant's busy working schedule, social schedule and vacation 
scheduler she did not have sufficient time to spend with the minor 
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child when he was ill, and would bring the minor child to be cared 
for by defendant-respondent on those occasions. (R. 256, 257) 
Because of plaintiff-appellant's schedule, the parties reversed 
roles, and defendant-respondent, became the primary caretaker of 
the minor child. (R. 257) It is based on these facts that the 
court articulated its findings as above stated. The findings are 
based on sufficient factual testimony and evidence and should not 
be set aside. 
III. IN THE PRESENT FACT SITUATION, THE REMARRIAGE 
OF DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT TO A FULL-TIME HOMEMAKER 
CONSTITUTED A MATERIAL CHANGE OF CIRCUMSTANCES TO 
JUSTIFY REOPENING THE QUESTION OF CUSTODY. 
Plaintiff-appellant relies on the case of Kramer v. Kramer, 
738 P.2d 624 (Utah, 1987) for her proposition that the trial court 
erred in considering defendant-respondent's current marriage to a 
full-time homemaker to be a substantial and material change for 
purposes of reopening the custody issue. Plaintiff-appellant 
argues that the fact situation in the present case is identical to 
that in Kramer in which the trial court focused on the custodial 
parent only in determining whether there had been a material 
change of circumstances for purposes of reopening the custody 
issue. The trial court in that case held that the noncustodial 
parent in Kramer did not fall within the exception articulated in 
Hogge v. Hogge, wherein the court changed custody of the minor 
child to the noncustodial mother who had overcome emotional 
problems and could provide a stable home environment for her 
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children. 
However, Kramer was not intended to overrule the Hogge 
decision but only to limit its application to a circumstance 
wherein the trial court felt that the original decree of divorce 
was based on circumstances regarding the noncustodial parent. The 
court indicated in Kramer that it was not overruling the Hogge 
decision but merely limiting its application: 
The narrow construction we place on Hogge is not an 
innovation or change in our case law. Rather it is 
consistent with the approach this court has implicitly 
taken in applying the first prong of Hogge's change of 
custody test. Kramer, Id. at 627. 
Nevertheless, the trial court in Kramer, after hearing and 
weighing the evidence, ruled that the noncustodial parent had 
failed to carry the burden of material change in circumstances for 
purposes of reopening the custody issue. As such, the Kramer case 
can easily be distinguished from the present case now before this 
court in which the trial judge ruled that the noncustodial parent 
had indeed met his burden of proof in showing that there had been 
a material and substantial change of circumstances in relation to 
the issue of child custody since the time of the decree of 
divorce. 
Indeed, the ccurt in Kramer indicated that it was the trial 
court, and not the appellate court, who should weigh the presented 
evidence in order to determine whether or not a material change in 
circumstances has been met: 
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It is the trial court's prerogative to hear and weigh 
the conflicting evidence and to make findings of fact. 
We will not upset such findings when they are supported 
by substantiated record evidence. Kramer, Id. at 628. 
In the present case, although plaintiff-appellant attempted 
to rebut the evidence presented by defendant-respondent, the 
ruling of Judge Park indicates that in weighing the relative 
evidence presented by the parties, that he was more persuaded by 
that presented by defendant-respondent. The court's findings 
acknowledge the fact that since the decree of divorce, plaintiff-
appellant had spent substantially less time with the minor child 
than she had at the time of the decree. In fact, plaintiff-
appellant herself had chosen defendant-respondent and his new wife 
to be the caretaker of the minor child when she went on Caribbean 
cruises, (R. 257), when the child was sick (R. 257), and when she 
was involved in career pursuits (R. 256, 257). 
Indeed, since defendant-respondent's remarriage to a full-
time homemaker, defendant-respondent and his new wife, Lynda, have 
had Dagin in their home for approximately three-fourths of the 
time between May of 1985 through the beginning of the summer of 
1986. (R. 256, 257). Indeed, plaintiff-appellant herself chose 
to leave the minor child with his step-mother when he was sick 
with chicken pox so that he would receive the proper care and 
attention. (R. 257) Based on the evidence presented, it was in 
the trial court's discretion to determine that it was proper to 
enter a finding regarding defendant-respondent's remarriage to a 
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full-time homemaker since it was she who had in fact spent a great 
deal of time subsequent to the entry of the decree of divorce 
caring for the miner child of the parties to this action. 
Of particular significance in the Kramer decision is the fact 
that three of the Supreme Court justices merely concurred in Judge 
Zimmerman's opinion, to wit: Justice Durham, Associate Chief 
Justice Stewart, and Justice Howe. The written concurring 
opinions of Justice Stewart and Justice Howe indicate that they 
held some reservations in regards to the court's strict adherence 
to a standard which allows the trial court to focus only on the 
custodial parent ir determining whether or not there has been a 
material and substantial circumstances for purposes of reopening 
the custody issue. 
Associate Chief Justice Stewart stated: 
The nature of the parent-child relationship may never be 
discovered by the trial judge if he or she rigidly 
limits a hearing for a change in custody to determine 
whether there are changed circumstances, without any 
regard for how well the child is doing under the 
established custody relationship. Focusing only on 
alleged change of circumstances of one or the other of 
the parents may result in great harm to a child. 
Kramer, Id. at 628. 
Justice Stewart felt that the court's "strong emphasis on 
stability is reaching a point where it has become inappropriately 
severed from the underlying reason that supports the very 
principle of stability itself, i.e. the need to insure that 
custody awards are in the best interests of the child involved." 
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Kramer, Id. at 629. 
Justice Howe agreed with Justice Stewart and further stated 
his concern regarding a decree of divorce based on default in 
which the court had not entertained the evidence and entered a 
ruling on what would be in the best interests of the child: 
I have somewhat of the same concern in cases where 
divorce decree and custody of a child is obtained by 
default. In such instances there is no determination 
made by the court as to which parent would be superior 
in raising the child. Too rigid an application of the 
rule advocated by the majority would forever lock a 
child into the custody of one parent or the other where 
there has been no determination on the merits of 
parenting ability of either parent and custody has been 
awarded only because of the default of one parent in 
failing to oppose the complaint of the other. A child 
should not be subjected to spending the rest of his or 
her minority in a inferior environment because of the 
inaction of one parent at the time custody is awarded. 
Kramer, Id. at 629. 
This is certainly the case in the present action wherein 
defendant-respondent, who was unrepresented by counsel, merely 
entered into a stipulation with plaintiff-appellant and her 
attorney in the original action for divorce. The court had made 
no determination with regard to who would be the best custodial 
parent, and in fact, the court did not enter a finding determining 
plaintiff-appellant to be a "fit and proper person". Since no 
determination was made, the actions and intents of the parties 
become relevant. 
In the present case, defendant-respondent, in his proffered 
testimony, indicated that at the time of the decree of divorce he 
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anticipated plaintiff-appellant having a great deal more time to 
spend with the child, and acting as custodial parent. Since the 
decree of divorce, defendant-respondent had in fact had the child 
three-fourths of the time, which was unanticipated in the 
original decree of divorce, and had in fact become the custodial 
parent of the minor child, along with his new spouse, Lynda, who 
had cared for the child during the days when defendant-respondent 
was at work- Judge Park acknowledged the great amount of time 
that the minor child had spent with defendant-respondent and his 
current wife, as so articulated in Finding No. 7 of his Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Laws, which states: 
That subsequent to the entry of the decree of 
divorce and for that period of time beginning in 
May of 1985 and continuing through the beginning of 
the Summer of 1986, the defendant, at the request 
of plaintiff had the child visiting with him a 
significant period of time. From time to time when 
the mother needed assistance with the care of the 
child, she brought the child to the father. (R. 
194, 195) 
In this circumstance, the court in Finding 9b of its Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law made a determination that: 
The remarriage of defendant and his creation 
thereby of a stable home environment where the 
child can be cared for by a stepmother who is a 
homemaker, not working outside the home, during 
those times when the father is working, (R. 195) 
constituted a material change of circumstances for reopening the 
custody issue. Said determination of the court was based on the 
evidence and on the fact that defendant-respondent and his present 
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wife had in fact already had assumed much of the responsibility 
attendant to being a primary caretaker to the minor child, Dagin: 
The fact that the father had the child all of these days 
during that period of time in my opinion is not "knit 
picky". I think that was part of my consideration. If 
this had been a situation where the father had never had 
the child so that here we are putting the child over in 
a brand new environment something that would be strange 
to a child, at this point in time, that would been a 
futher consideration of mine. (R. 337) 
IV. AFTER DETERMINING THAT THERE HAD BEEN A 
MATERIAL CHANGE IN CIRCUMSTANCES FOR PURPOSES OF 
CHANGING CUSTODY, THE TRIAL COURT WAS CORRECT IN 
REOPENING THE ISSUE OF CUSTODY AND DETERMINING WHAT WAS 
IN THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD. 
Once the trial court has determined that there has been a 
substantial and material change in circumstances for purposes for 
modifying the decree of divorce regarding child custody, the court 
"must determine denovo which custody arrangement will serve the 
welfare or best interests of the child, and modify, or refuse to 
modify, the decree accordingly." Hogge, Id. at 54. 
In Marchant v. Marchant, 66 Utah Adv. Rpt. 45 (September 18, 
1987) this court adopted the standards to be considered by a trial 
court in child custody cases to be "function-related factors", and 
adopted the standards as earlier set forth in Pusey v. Pusey, 728 
P.2d 117 (Utah, 1986) as follows: 
1. The identity of the primary caretaker during the 
marriage. 
2. The identity of the parent with greater flexibility 
to provide personal care for the child, 
3. The identity of the parent with whom the child has 
spent most of his or her time pending custody 
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determination if that time has been lengthy, and 
4. The stability of the environment provided by each 
parent. Marchant, Id. at 47. 
In the present case, the Fourth Judicial District Court, 
after first determining that a material change of circumstances 
had taken place regarding custody, entertained all of the 
appropriate factors as enunciated in Pusey v. Pusey and Marchant 
v. Marchant and articulated in Finding No. 18 of its Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law as follows: 
The court having determined that there exists a material 
change in circumstance, finds it necessary to determine 
what is in the best interests of the minor child. 
Therefore, the court takes into consideration the 
following: 
a. Primary Caretaker. Although the plaintiff has 
technically been the primary custodian of Dagin, it is 
not easy to determine whether or not she has been the 
constant primary caretaker. The court notes Exhibit "1" 
of plainitff (sic) delineating actual custody time 
periods. 
b. Time Available. The court finds that there has been 
a material change in the time available for the 
plaintiff to spend with the minor child, both parents 
now working full-time as opposed to the earlier 
situation. 
c. Stability of the Environment. The court finds 
significant changes in environment and goals of the 
plaintiff and further notes a considerable degree of 
stability of environment in the defendant. 
d. Relationship to stepparent and step-sibling. The 
court finds that the day care center in which the child 
is presently enrolled appears to be an excellent 
facility, well staffed with state of the art technology. 
The court further finds that the stepmother, Lynda 
Fullmer, has developed an excellent loving relationship 
with the minor child and will be available as a 
homemaker in the home at times needed by the child. The 
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court further finds that the minor child has seemed to 
develop an excellent appropriate relationship with his 
stepsister, Christa. (R. 198, 199) 
The trial court also placed a considerable amount of weight 
on the child custody evaluation conducted by Bert Petersen, LCSW 
of Child Custody Evaluation Services which recommended that 
custody of Dagin be given to defendant-respondent. The court 
noted in Finding Nc. 20 of its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law, "the court finds that it is in agreement with the conclusion 
of Mr. Petersen as contained in his report." (R. 200) 
In his report, Mr. Peterson looked at ten factors in 
determining what would be in the best interests of the minor 
child, to wit: primary caretaker, time available, integration into 
the family, stability of the environment, religious training, 
interference with visitation, frequent changes of residence, move 
out of state, relationship to stepparent and step-sibling, and 
support system. In particular, Mr. Peterson noted that within a 
ten month period, plaintiff-appellant had moved four times within 
a ten month period. In addition, she had had frequent changes of 
jobs and had placed the minor child in two different day care 
centers. (R. 58) 
On the other hand, the evaluator noted that defendant-
respondent had not had any changes of employment or residence and 
stated that the childfs pediatrician had noted "a much calmer 
Dagin at a checkup towards the end of summer. The doctor would 
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not draw scientific conclusions from what he had observed but 
suggested that perhaps the child was feeling secure where he was 
living at the time. At that time he was living with his father." 
(R. 58) The evaluator also noted "although Laura has technically 
been the primary custodian of Dagin, it is not easy to determine 
if she has been the constant primary caretaker." (R.58) 
The evaluator then inquired into whether Dagin, the minor 
child, was better off in a day care center or with his stepmother. 
To that end, the evaluator noted the following: 
At the day care center this evaluator asked if Dagin1s 
teacher had ever asked the class to draw a picture of a 
family. They reported that they had and sent the 
pictures home with their parents. At Laura's home the 
picture was found, and she gave permission to this 
evaluator to keep the picture for reference. The 
drawing includes four figures on one side of the paper 
and a single figure on the other side of the paper. 
Dagin identified a mom with four figures and a mom as a 
single figure on the other side. He identified himself 
in the figure of four. Although we cannot draw 
conclusions as to who he wants to live with from the 
drawing, we can get a suggestion that Dagin has a 
concept of family that includes four people. Included 
in the picture were definitely a dad, a mom and Dagin 
and one other figure. (R. 58) 
The decision of the trial court awarding custody of the minor 
child to defendant-respondent was supported by the evidence and 
testimony on the record, and it was "the trial court's prerogative 
to hear and weigh the conflicting evidence and to make findings of 
fact. We will not upset such findings when they are supported by 
substantial record evidence." Kramer at 628. 
Contrary to the arguments of plaintiff-appellant, the trial 
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court did not make an award of custody to the stepmother. Indeed, 
a decision in the opposite result, if that analysis were followed, 
would lead to the conclusion that an award of custody to 
plaintiff-appellant would in fact be awarding custody of the minor 
child to a child care institution since plaintiff-appellant works 
full-time. Indeed, it is not plaintiff-appellant who will be 
taking care of the child during the day, but the day care center. 
Plaintiff-appellant's argument ignores the fact that the basis 
upon which she claims discrimination is the exact basis upon which 
she claims defendant-respondent should not be given custody of the 
minor child, that being full-time employment. 
Although the issue of employment was raised in regards to 
time availability of each of the parties to spend with the minor 
child, the court based its decision on award of custody on the 
relative stability of the parties as articulated in Finding No. 12 
of the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law as follows: 
The court finds that the child should dwell in a stable 
environment and that the defendant, petitioner herein, 
can provide better stability and is in a better position 
to take care of the minor child at the present time. (R. 
196) 
The court, having reviewed the child custody evaluation in 
which it was noted that stability of environment is important for 
the overall development of a minor child (R. 58), the testimony 
and evidence regarding plaintiff-appellant's frequent moves and 
job changes and the remarriage of defendant-respondent to a full-
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time homemaker, the court could properly find that defendant-
respondent had a greater stability in environment for raising the 
minor child, and therefore it was in the best interests of the 
minor child for custody to be awarded to defendant-respondent. 
V. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT DID NOT SET AN 
APPROPRIATE AMOUNT FOR PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT TO PAY TO 
DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT AS CHILD SUPPORT. 
Once the trial court had determined that defendant-respondent 
should be entitled to custody of the minor child, it should have 
set an appropriate amount in child support to be payable to 
defendant-respondent from plaintiff-appellant based on her earning 
capacity. Indeed, it was an abuse of discretion of the trial 
court not to do so. 
Not only did the trial court fail to award defendant-
respondent an appropriate amount in child support from plaintiff-
appellant, the court ordered defendant-respondent to pay to 
plaintiff-appellant $250 a month for the three summer months that 
she had visitation with the minor child. In doing so, the court 
failed to take into consideration that there would be nine months 
out of the year in which plaintiff-appellant would have little or 
no financial obligation for the minor child, since the entire 
expense for the minor child would be born by defendant-respondent 
during the nine months in which he would have custody. Certainly, 
plaintiff-appellant, since she was not ordered to pay child 
support, could save the amounts that she should have been paying 
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in child support in order to support herself and the minor child 
during the three summer months visitation period. 
VI. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN 
FAILING TO TERMINATE THE PREVIOUS AWARD OF ALIMONY. 
Although the trial court found that at the time of the decree 
of divorce, plaintiff-appellant was only working part-time, and 
that at the present time, plaintiff-appellant had acquired a full-
time position and was making twice the amount of money that she 
did at the time of the decree of divorce, it failed to terminate 
the alimony award given in the original decree of divorce of $200 
a month. 
In paragraph 11 of the court's Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law, it indicated that it was of the "opinion that 
alimony in this matter should not continue forever." As such, the 
court took a position that the award of alimony was merely "to 
provide a cushion to defendant to return to a self-sustaining 
status." Claus v. Claus, 727 P.2d 184 (Utah, 1986). 
Since plaintiff-appellant was now working full-time as a 
receptionist for a law firm, she was no longer in need of 
defendant-respondent's assistance and alimony should have been 
terminated immediately. Indeed, it was an abuse of discretion for 
the court's failure to do so. 
VII. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY AWARDED THE 1987 AND 
1988 FEDERAL AND STATE INCOME TAX EXEMPTION FOR THE 
MINOR CHILD TO DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT. 
In entering its decision that defendant-respondent would be 
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entitled to the 1987 and 1988 income tax exemptions for the minor 
child, the court articulated that "he will be in primary custody 
at the end of 1987 for the bulk for 1988." (R. 321) 
When further questioned by plaintiff-appellant's attorney 
regarding his decision, Judge Park indicated: 
...and so there is going to be a tax saving and I sort 
of took that into consideration when I raised his child 
support to $250 instead $150. If we can create a 
greater stream of income for that purpose, I think that 
is what we ought to do. That is one of the reasons I 
raised the child support for those three months or 
whatever she elects to take during the summer. (R. 324) 
Of particular note is the fact that the trial court awarded 
the payment of $250 per month in child support for the three 
summer months in which plaintiff-appellant would have visitation 
with the minor child. Subsequently, on the 9th day of February, 
1988, this court ordered defendant-respondent to pay $250 a month 
in support from November, 1987 until final disposition of this 
appeal. 
Based on the fact that Judge Park increased child support 
from defendant-respondent to appellant-plaintiff by virtue of the 
fact that he had awarded to defendant-respondent the income tax 
exemptions for 1987 and 1988 for the minor child of the parties, 
Judge Park's decision in that regard should be upheld. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff-appellant has failed to show that the Fourth 
Judicial District Court abused its discretion when it awarded 
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custody of the minor child to defendant-respondent. In the 
absence of such a showing, this court should affirm and uphold 
Judge Park's prior rulings. In the event this court feels that 
the lower court decision is not substantiated by sufficient 
findings, then defendant-respondent requests this court remand all 
issues for further hearing. 
DATED this !(p day of March, 1988. 
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